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Sustainable medium-term debt strategies are  Catsambas and Pigato analyze three funda-
essential to adjustment programs committed to  mental concepts of deficit:  cash (or observed),
high growth and should be integrated into a  primary, and operational.  They show that the
consistent macroeconomic framework that  operational deficit best reflects the government's
encompasses debt, growth, and inflation strate-  absorption of real resources and is thus the most
gies.  appropriate indicator for measuring fiscal policy
under stabilization and adjustment.
One initial step in this direction is the
unification of the accounts of the government  Applying their model to the empirical data
and the central bank, to insure that some compo-  for Kenya and Ghana, Catsambas and Pigato
nents of the budget are not shifted from one to  reach these conclusions:
the other.  A second step is to evaluate the gov-
ernment's fiscal stance in relation to stabiliza-  The fiscal effort in Kenya should inave  been
tion objectives.  somewhat stronger between 1980 and 1987.  For
the period 1988-91, Ltie  projected fiscal balance
Catsambas and Pigato have developed an  is broadly consistent with stabilization, and the
analytical model that takes both steps into  same goal can be achieved with a lower inflation
account.  Its purpose is to analyze the relation-  or growth rate.
ship between the fiscal deficit, the real interest
rate, the real growth rate, and the real exchange  In Ghana, the average fiscal performance
rate - and to indicate what conditions would be  between 1980 and 1987 was only slightly
necessary to stabilize a country's debt-to-GDP  weaker than it should have been. Projections for
ratio in the long run.  1988-91 suggest that the government has
substantial room for maneuver in its stabilization
goals.
This paper is a product of the Trade and Finance Division, Africa Technical Depart-
ment.  Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washing-
ton DC 20433.  Please contact Miriam Ruminski, room J8-262, extension 34349.
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
Produced at the PPR Dissemination CenterTA3LE  OF CONTENTS
PAGE  NO.
PREFACE
I. INTRODUCTION ...............  .. *.****,*..........  01
II.  THE  GOVERNMENT  AND  THE  CENTRAL  BANK:
A UNIFIED APPROACH  ...............................  06
III.  THE  ANALYTICS  OF BUDGET  DEFICITS  AND  DEBT
ACCUMULATION  .....  ... to**.......12
IV.  AN EMPIRICAL  INVESTIGATION:  THE  CASE  OF  KENYA
AND GHANA.  ............  . ......  .....  . 20
1.  Purpose  of empirical  investigation  and
description  of  methodology..................... 21
2.  Kenya ..................  000  24
a. Background ...........  ...................  24
b.  Empirical results .........  . ..............  26
3. Ghana ......  *see*  ...............  *.e...*  ......  *..  34
a.  Background *........  ..  ..  34
b. Empirical results ..  .........  sees  39
V. SUMMARY, CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS  ........  ...  51
TABLES
Table  1.  Kenya: Basic Fiscal Indicators  ..............  27
Table  2.  Kenya:  Fiscal  Policy  Concepts  and
Macroeconomic Variables ................. 30
Table 3. Kenya: A Consistent Fiscal Policy Framework ....  32
Table 4.  Kenya: A Consistent Macroeconomic Framework ....  35
Table 5. Ghana: Basic Fiscal Indicators  ............  40
Table  6.  Ghana:  Fiscal  Policy  Concepts  and
Macroeconomic Variables  ...........  ....  43
Table 7. Ghana: A Consistent Fiscal Policy Framework ....  46
Table 8.  Ghana: A Consistent Macroeconomic  Framework ....  48GRAPHS
Graph  1.  Kenya:  Deficit  Concepts,  1980-1987  .............  28
Graph  2.  Kenyas  Deficit  Projections,  1988-1991  ..........  33
Graph  3. Kenya:  Growth  Projections,  1988-1991 ...........  36
Graph  4. Kenya:  Inflation  Projections,  1988-1991  ........  37
Graph  5. Ghana:  Deficit  Concepts,  1980-1987  . .............  41
Graph  6. Ghana:  Deficit  Projections,  1988-1991  ..........  47
Graph  7.  Ghana:  Growth  Projections,  1988-1991  ...........  49
Graph  8. Ghana:  Inflation  Projec*ions,  1988-1991  .........  50
APPENDICES
Appendix  1.  The  Sustainable  Current  Account  Deficit  .....  57
Appendix  2. Sources  of  Data ........................... 61
Appendix  3.  Definition  of  Variables  ...... *  ..............  62
REFERENCES  . ......................  .. *.  ....  ........  64
The  authors  are  obliged  to Ajay  Chhibber,  Homi  Kharas,  Kathie  Kruumm,  Vikram
Nehru  and  Michael  Sarris  for  comments  and  helpful  suggestions  on an earlier
draft. Maneesha  Vaishampayan  provided  valuable  help  in aspects  of computer
interface  and  Miriam  Ruminski  competently  typed  various  versions  of the
paper  under  tight  deadlines.Preface
Adjustment  with growth  is  the  dominant  objective  of reform
programs  supported  by the  World  Bank in  the  past few  years. Within  this
context,  African  countries,  particularly  those  with  high  indebtedness,  aim
at achieving  structural  adjustment  while  pursuing  stabilization  goals. In
many instances,  stabilizing  domestic  and  external  debt  as a ratio  of GDP is
a prerequisite  for  a  successful  medium-term  structural  adjustment  strategy.
This  paper  brings  into  sharp  focus  the  relationship  between  the
government  deficit  and  key  macroeconomic  parameters. It  discusses  the
consistency  of fiscal  policy  with the  stabilization  objectives  of
government,  both in  a historical  context  and  as a background  for  evaluating
proposed  policy  actions. By calculating  the  "operational"  deficit,  which
best reflects  the  government's  claims  on resources,  and  combining  the
accounts  of the  Central  Bank  with  the fiscal  balance,  the  paper  presents  an
integrated  framework  for  the  assessment  of the  fiscal  stance  and  its
consistency  with the  inflation,  the  growth,  the  interest  and  the  real
exchange  rates.
The  conceptual  framework  is applied  in  Ghana  and  Kenya,  and  the
empirical  results  are  compared  with critical  developments  in  the  past  and
with  projections  for  the  period  through  1991. Apart  from  the  analytical
conclusions,  the  authors  point  out  the  need for  more accurate  information
on the stock  and  flow  statistics  of Government  and  the  Central  Bank  for  the
effective  design  and  successful  implementation  of an adjustment  strategy.The  paper  was  prepared  in the  Trade  and  Finance  Division  of the
Africa  Technical  Department  in  the  context  of ongoing  work  on 'earning
from,  and  deepening  of the  adjustment  process.THE  CONSISTENCY  OF  FISCAL  POLICY  WITH
MACROECONOMIC  ADJUSTMENT:  CONCEPTS,  METHODOLOGY
AND  AN EMPIRICAL  INVESTIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Policy  responses  by developing  countries  to the  deterioration  of
domestic  and  external  imbalances  in  the late  1970s  may  be classified  into  two
categories:  stabilization  policies,  which  aimed  at reducing  the  disequilibria
through  contractionary  demand-management  policies;  and  structural  adjustment
policies,  which  aimed  at improving  both  demand  and  supply  conditions,  while
also  changing  the  institutional  parameters  of the  system.
Since  the  early  1980s  the  World  Bank  has  supported  policies  of
structural  adjustment,  which  have  gradually  moved  away  from  sectoral  lending
and  have  encompassed  an increasingly  larger  part  of the  macroeconomy.  An
integral  part  of the  adjustment  programs  has  been  the  redesign  of sustainable
debt  strategies  that  a country  may adopt  in  the  medium  term  given  its
contemporaneous  commitment  to a  high  growth  policy. The concern  about  growing
deficits  and  debts  stems  from  three,  usually  interrelated,  economic  and
political  consequences:  (a)  the  eventual  monetization  of deficits,  which  may
lead  to hyperinflation  situations;  (b)  the  financial  crowding  out  of  private
investment;  and (c)  fears  of debt  repudiation.-2-
It is  not  the  aim  of this  paper  to discuss  extensively  these  issues.
However,  it is  worth  noting  that  the  deN3lopment  of a consistent  macroeconomic
framework  is increasingly  recognized  as  D_  ?rereqwtisite  for  a successful
implementation  of the  structural  policies  envisaged  in  the  adjustment  process.l/
It is,  therefore,  important  to clarify  the  inter-relationships  among  fiscal
deficits,  domestic  and  external  debt,  and  macroeconomic  variables  in the
context  of a typical  adjustment  program. This  is the  underlying  theme  of this
paper.
The  most important  policy  question  is  what  operational  framework  best
describes  the  absorption  of resources  by the  public  sector,  especially  as
regards  the  tradeoff  between  servicing  of the  debt  and  non-interest  government
spending. Since  the  revival  of the  Ricardian  Equivalence  Principle  21  Barro
(1974),  there  has  been a growing  literature  on the  subject,  which  has focused
on the  proper  definition  of the  budget  deficit.3/ The  Ricardian  Equivalence
represents  an extreme  view  of debt  neutrality  and  its  empirical  validity  has
been  all  but  refuted  in  practice  for  both  developed  and  developing  countries.4/
1/  See, for  example,  "Issues  in  Modeling  Macroeconomic  Adjustment"  (1988),
for  a comprehensive  outline  of the  features  that  would  be desirable  in
models  of adjustment.
2/  Under  the  assumptions  that  capital  markets  are  perfect,  consumers  are
rational  and  care  about  their  heirs,  and  taxes  are  not  distortionary
the  Ricardian  Equivalence  theory  states  that  the  effects  of governmeltt
expenditure  are  the  same  irrespective  of the  way it is financed.
3/  Buiter  (1985)  provides  an excellent  taxonomy  of the  various  aspects  of
the  problem.
4!  See,  for  example,  Modigliani  et al (1985),  Haque  (1987)  and  Haque  and
Montiel  (1987).-3-
There  remains,  however,  the  question  of which is  the  most appropriate  concept
of the  budgetary  balance  for  the evaluation  of the  fiscal  stance  within  the
contoxt  of adjustment.
There  are  two  basic  problems  with the  conventional  measurement  of
government  stocks  and flows  First,  changes  in  the real  value  of public  assets
due  either  to inflation  or to  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  are  not accounted
for.  Second,  the  conventional  deficit  may be artificially  inflated  by the
presence  of an inflation  premium  in  the interest  payments  of the  budget.  It
may be  argued  that  this  premium  is  not regarded  as income  by the recipierts  of
interest  but, rather,  as  a restoration  of the inflation-induced  capital  losses
of the private  sector. As a result,  private  agents  are  not affected  in  their
spending  decisions  by the inflation  component  of interest  receipts;  in  other
words,  private  consumption  would  not fully  respon.  to nominal  interest  income.
The proponents  of this  view  argue  that,  consequently,  the  most appropriate
definition  of the  budget  balance  is  the  so-called  operational  deficit,  which
is  purged  from  the inflation  premium  of interest  payments  and is  additionally
expressed  in  real  terms.  5/
Another  concept  of  the fiscal  balance  that  deviates  from  the
conventional  definition  is  the  primarv  deficit,  'ohich  is  the non-interest
component  of the  budgetary  accounts. As such,  this  concept  gives  an
indication  of the impact  of current  fiscal  stance  on aggregate  demand,  since
the interest  paid  on debt is  only  the  result  of past  fiscal  policies.  61
5/  See,  for  example,  Cukierman  and  Mortensen  (1983)  for  one of the  most
thorough  expositions  of this  view.
6/  A further  explanation  of the three  concepts  of deficit  is presented  in
Report  on Adjustment  Lending,  The  World  Bank,  August  8, 1988.It  is  well  beyond  the  scope  of the  present  paper  to contribute  to
this  debate  7/ ,  but it  is now  well recognized  that  the  operational  deficit
best  reflects  the  absorption  of real  resources  by governme  t, and  thus  is  the
most appropriate  measure  of  fiscal  policy  within  the  framework  of
stabilization  and  adjustment.  This Is  particularly  important  for  countries
whose  major  concern  is  the  containment  of domestic  and  external  debt.  For
example,  the  operational  deficit  identifies  all  capital  losses  on external
debt,  on both  a cash  and  an accrual  basis,  resulting  from  a  real  devaluation
of the  exchange  rate.
A  related  conceptual  and  empirical  issue  is  the  interface  between
government  and  the  Central  Bank  in  the  financing  of the  fiscal  deficit.
Although,  in  principle,  the  operations  of government  are  separate  from  those
of the  Central  Bank,  in  some  countries  the  accounts  of the  Central  Bank  are
often  used  to "hide'  the  fiscal  deficit. This  practice  obscures  the
Implications  of large  budget  deficits  and  introduces  an element  of  uncertainty
in assessing  the  true  stance  of fiscal  policy  and  in  drawing  policy
implications  for  the  future.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to develop  a conceptual  framework  that
may  be used  to analyze  the  long  term  sustainability  of fiscal  deficits  in
relation  to policy  constraints  posed  by the  accumulation  of public  debt. The
paper  highlights  the  relationships  among  the  fiscal  deficit,  the real  interest
rate,  the real  growth  rate  and  the  real  exchange  rate  and  indicates
7/  See  Cats-4mbas  (1988)  for  a skeptical  view  on a  mechanical  application
of inflation  accounting  and  related  matters.-5-
the  conditions  that  would  be necessary  for  a country  to stabilize  its  debt/GDP
ratio  in  the long  run. The  analysis  involves  the  calculation  of  three
concepts  of deficit  discussed  ea~rlier:  The  cash  or observed  deficih,  the
primarv  deficit,  and  the  operational  deficit,  and  provides  a  quantitative
estimate  of  the  extent  of the  fiscal  adjustment,  i.e.  the  required
mobilization  of domestic  resources  for  achieving  the  desirable  debt/GDP  ratio
over  the  course  of the  adjustment  program.
The  analysis,  with  minor  modifications,  is  very similar  to the  spirit
of the  Anand  and  van  Wijenber .n  (1988)  and  Coutinho  (1988),  but less
ambitious  than  the  subsequent  empirical  work on  Turkey  and  Brazil. The
present  paper  is  basically  a quantification  of  macroeconomic  identities  with
no attempt  to provide  econometric  estimates  of  behavioral  relationships.  As
such,  it is  but  a first  step  towards  the  development  of a  consistent
analytical  framework  for  the  evaluation  of iiscal  policy  in  African  countries.
The analysis  is  basically  methodological  and  two  empirical  examples  are
presented  primarily  for  expository  purposes.
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows. The  next  part  deals  with the
interface  between  government  and  Central  Bank  account3  and  derives  the
appropriate  definition  of external  debt  for  analytical  purposes. The  third
part  turns  to the  analytics  of deficits  and  deb-  within  a unified  framework
between  government  and  the  Central  Bank. The fourth  part  presents  an
empirical  investigation  of the  model  for  two  African  countries,  Kenya  and
Ghana,  that  have  had fairly  dissimilar  experiences  in  the 1980s. The last
part  summarizes  the  findings,  highlights  tue  caveats  of the  analysis  and  draws
conclusions  for  further  research.II.  THE GOVEPNMENT  AND  THE CENTRAL  BANK:
A  UNIFIED  APPROACH
This  part  describes  the  methodology  that  unifies  the  accounts  of the
Central  Bank  and  Government  in  such  a  way  as to eliminate  the  accidental  or
intentional  'shifting"  of the  budget  deficit  (or  part  thereof)  to the  accounts
of the  Bank,  thus  obscuring  the  true  extent  of  public  sector  activity. Such  a
procedure  is necessitated  by the fact  that  the  Government  typically  lacks  a
recorded  capital  account,  whereas  the  Central  Bank  always  has  one in  the  form
of  a  balance  sheeo. As a result,  the  Government  usually  records  only  the
operations  that  affect  its  income  statement  (i.e.  the  economic  flows  related
to its  budget),  but ignores  transactions  that  would  affect  its  capital
account,  notably.  capital  gains  and  losses.
This  asymmetrical  treatment  gives  rise  to  potentially  paradoxical
results,  which  may  be  occasionally  misleading.  Consider,  for  example,  the
case  of capital  gains  and  losses  resulting  from  a devaluation.  For
simplicity,  let  us assume  that,  at a  given  point  in time,  the  outstanding  debt
of government  is  exactly  equal  to the  net  foreign  assets  of the  Central  Bank.
Furthermore,  suppose  that  the  (average)  interest  rate  paid  by the  Government
on its  debt  is equal  to  the (average)  rate  received  by the  Central  Bank  on its
net foreign  assets. If  a devaluation  takes  place,  then  the  following  four
effects  will occurs
(a)  on the  income  account  (deficit)  of the  Government,  there  will  be an
increase  in foreign  interest  paymenta,  and  thus  the  deficit  will
deteriorate;(b)  on the (hypothetical)  capital  account  of the  Government,  there  will
be an increase  in  the  value  of foreign  debt,  and  thus  the  net  worth
of Government  will decline;
(c)  on the  income  account  of the  Central  Bank,  there  will  be an increase
in foreign  interest  receipts,  and  thus  the  profit  position  will
improve;
(d)  on the  capital  account  (balance  sheet)  of the  Central  Bank,  there
will be an increase  in  the  value  of net  foreign  assets,  and  the  net
worth  of the  Bank  will increase.
Furthermore,  since  we assumed  that  the  goverrment  debt  equals  net
foreign  assets  and  the  interest  rate  is identical  on both  receipts  and
payments,  these  transactions  conceptually  cancel  out  and  the  net  position  of
the  public  sector  (defined  here  as  Governmen_  plus  the  Central  Bank)  remains
unchanged.
In  practice,  however,  all  depends  on the  treatment  of the  various
accounts. Usually,  the  government  capital  account  is  ignored  and,  therefore,
even if (higher)  interest  receipts  of the  Central  Bank  are  offset  by (higher)
interest  payments  in  the  budget,  the  net  position  of the  public  sector
seemingly  appears  to  have improved  thanks  to the  increase  in the  Central
Bank's  net  worth.-8-
This  misleading  result  obviously  calls  for  a redefinition  of the
government  accounts,  to  allow  for  the  capital  changes  that  occur  in the
Central  Bank's  accounts. This  correction  takes  the  form  of adding
(algebraically)  the  change  in  the  Central  Bank's  net  worth  to the  budget
deficit. From  the  profit-and-loss  account  of the  Central  Bank  we may identify
the  change  in net  worth  (in  terms  of flows)  as interest  receipts  plus  capital
gains  or losses  on  net foreign  assets. This  is  shown  in equation  (1):
(N  W) - iE(NFA) +  E(NFA)  (1)
where  NW - net  worth  of the  Central  Bank,
i =  the  average  nominal  interest  rate  on foreign  holdings,
E  - the  nominal  exchange  rate,
NFA  = net  foreign  assets  of the  Central  Bank.
A  dot  over  a variable  denotes  its  time  derivative.
We may  then  redefine  the  budget  deficit  as:
DEFR =  DEF - (N  W) =  DEF - iE(NFA) - E(NFA)  (2)
Where  DEFR  - revised  deficit
DEF  = original  deficit
and  the remaining  variables  are  as defined  earlier.- 9  -
According  to equation  (2),  an increase  (reduction)  in  Central  Bank's
net  worth  will reduce  (increase)  the  original  deficit. The  basic  premise  is
that  the (net)  financial  position  of  the  Monetary  Authority  8/ is influenced
by the  generation  of profits  or losses  in  the  Central  Bank.  This  is a
conceptual  formulation  and  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  Central  Bank
will always  transfer  its  profits  to the  budget. However,  in  some  countries
this  is indeed  an established  procedure.
Consider,  now,  the  two  sides  of the  budget  identity:
*  . . .
G - T + nB + iEB  -Cg  + B + EB  (3)
where  G  - non-interest  spending
T  - tax  and  not-tax  revenue
n  - average  nominal  interest  rate  on domestic  debt
B  =  domestic  debt  outstanding
i  - average  nominal  interest  rate  on  external  debt
E  =  nominal  exchange  rate
B* - foreign  debt  outstanding
Cg =  credit  by Central  Bank  to Government
8/  In  the  remainder  of this  paper  we follow  the  IFS  definition  of the
Monetary  Authority,  according  to  which  the  accounts  of the  Central  Bank
are  consolidated  with the  accounts  arising  from  monetary  functions  of
the  Government,  such  as the  issuance  of currency  or  the  holding  of
international  reserves  and  positions  vis-a-vis  the IMF.- 10  -
In a  very  simplified  framework,  where  the  Central  Bank  assets  are  only
net  foreign  assets  and  the  credit  to government,  the  definition  of  net  worth
yields:
NW  - E(NFA)  + Cg - M  (4)
where  M is the  monetary  base.
Therefore,  (N  W) - E(NFA)  +  E(NFA)  +  Cg  - M  (5)
Equation  (5),  which  is  obtained  from  the  balance  sheet  of the  Central
Bank,  is  the counterpart  to equation  (1),  which  was obtained  from  the  profit-
and-loss  account.
To incorporate  the  Central  Bank's  accounts  into  equation  (3),  the
change  in  the  net  worth  of the  Bank  must  be subtracted  from  both  the  sources
of financing  and from  the  deficit.
Hence,  we subtract  equation  (1)  from  the  left-hand  side  of equation
(3)  and  equation  (5)  from  the  right-hand  side:
G - T +  nB +  iEB  - iE(NFA)  - E(NFA)  =  - E(NFA)  - E(NFA)  +  Cg  -
- Cg +  A + B + EB  (6)
Collecting  and  rearranging  terms  we finally  arrive  at:
*  *
G  - T+nB  +iE(B  - NFA)H-M+  B+ E(B  - NFA)  (7)- 11 -
Equation  (7)  reflects  a  unified  (although  not,  strictly  speaking,
consolidated)  approach  to the  measurement  of government  and  Central  Bank
accounts.  It  properly  reflects  both  the  income  statement  and  the  capital
accounts  of the  two  public  sector  entitie*. For  example,  following  the
earlier  illustration  with  B* - NFA,  the  net  interest  payments  of the  Monetary
Authority  would  be zero. Similarly,  by  using  the  identity:
E(B - NFA)  - (E(B  NFA))  - E(B- NFA)  (8)
it  can  also  be seen  that  the  capital  gains  of the  Central  Bank  would  be fully
offset  by the  capital  losses  of government  (the  last  term  in equation  (8).
Alternatively,  this  would  imply  that  a depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate
would  not  affect  the  net  interest  payments  of the  public  sector.
The importance  of  the  corrections  reflected  in equation  (7),  if
properly  measured  in  empirical  research,  cannot  be overstated.  By deriving  a
consistent  set  of flow  and  stock  accounts  for  both  the  Government  and  the
Central  Bank,  one  can  effectively  eliminate  the  possibility  that (part  of)  the
budget  deficit  may  be shifted  to the  Central  Bank.  In  other  words,  equation
(7)  is the  closest  concept  to the  evaluation  of the  'true"  fiscal  stance  in a
given  country.- 12  -
III.  THE  ANALYTICS  OF BUDGET  DEFICITS  AND  DEBT  ACCUMULATION
According  to the Analysis  of the  previous  section,  the  budget
constraint  may  now  be expressed  as:
G +  nB +  iEF  - T  -M+  B +  EF  (9)
*
where  F - B  - NFA
Equation  (9)  says  that  the  excess  of non-interest  expenditures  (G)
plus interest  payments  on the  domestic  (nB)  and  foreign  (iEF)  components  of
the  public  debt  over  taxes  (T)  must  be necessarily  financed  by changes  in the
stock  of  high-powered  money (M),  by issuing  new  government  delbt  (B),  or by
using  the  proceeds  of foreign  borrowing  (F). A dot  over  a variable  indicates
its  time  derivative.
Dividing  through  equation  (9)  by the  domestic  price  level,  P,  we
obtain  the  same  relationship  in real  terms:
g +  nb +  ief - t  M +  +  eF*  (9')
where  a lower-case  variable  "z'  reflects  the  real  value  of generic
Z  EP* variable  "Z",  i.e.  z  - . Note  that  e  is the  real  exchange  rate,
where  P  is the  foreign  price  level. Then,
p - b +  br  (10)- 13  -
MjuMl  (11)
F*, f  +  f*  (12)
P  *  p*
where  X  - - and  1 - - are,  respectively,  the  rates  of domestic  and
p  P
foreign  inflation.
By using  Fisher's  identity  of exchange,  MV  PQ,  equation  (11)  may be
rewritten  as
i
M (q  +X-9)  m  (13)
where  q _-  is  the  real  rate  of growth  of GDP,  and
d _ -f is  the rate  of change  of the  income  velocity  of  base  money.
Substituting  equations  (10),  (12)  and (13)  into  equation  (9')  we
obtain:
g - t +  nb +  ief - (q  +  r - G)m  +  b +  br +  e (f  + fr)  (14)
which,  upon collecting  and  rearranging  terms,  yields:
g  - t  + rb  +  r*ef  - (q  +  n - O)m  +  b + e£  (15)
where  r - n - r  and  r  - i  - r.
Equation  (15)  describes  explicitly  the  budget  constraint  in real
terms. It says  that  the  excess  of government  interest  and  non-interest
payments  over  taxes  (the  left-hand  side  of  the  equation),  must  be financed- 14 -
through  a change  in the  real  value  of domestic  debt (b)  or of foreign  debt
(ef),  or by a  change  in the  real  value  of the  monetary  base (q  +  ir  - O)m.
These  alternative  means  of financing  are,  obviously,  not  mutually  exclusive.
To evaluate  the  capital  gains  or losses  resulting  from  changes  in  the
real  exchange  rate,  we may use  the  following  identity:
(eof)  - ef +  ef  - efe  +  ef  (16)
A  e
where  e  - is the  change  in  the  real  exchange  rate.
e
Substituting  for  ef from  equation  (16)  into  (15)  and  collecting  terms
we obtain:
g - t + rb  + (r + e) fe - (q  + r  - O)m  + b + (e  f)  (17)
Equation  (17)  gives  a  measure  of the  operational  deficit,  that  is the  deficit
expressed  in real  terms  and  with interest  payments  evaluated  at real  rather
than  nominal  interest  rates. In  the  nominal  definition  of the  deficit
(equation  9) interest  payments  are  included  in  the  left-hand  side  of the
equation  but  amortization  payments  are  not. If government  securities  are
issued  at variable  interest  rates,  an increase  in  the  inflation  rate  will be
reflected  in  an increase  in  nominal  interest  payments. However,  the  real- 15  -
value  of the  stock  of debt  decreases  at the  same  time.  This  is  not  reflected
in  equation  9.  The  operational  deficit  is the  most  relevant  indicator  of
fiscal  stance  when economic  agents  do  not  suffer  from  money  illusion.  9|
In  order  to highlight  the  constraints  imposed  on fiscal  policy  by
different  financing  policies,  it 's  necessary  to express  the  components  of
equation  (17)  as ratios  of income. Dividing  through  by real  GDP,  y,  we
obtain:
&_^_t  + rp + (r*  + e)#  . (q  +  Jr  _  is)p  +  by  + (ey_)  (18)
where  a lower  case  greek  letter  represents  an income  ratio:
,  0  .ef,  p  = m.  Furthermore,
y  y  y
b "  *  +  pq sad  (19)
(e  f)  (
0  + oq  (20)
9/  Higher  inflation  rates  are  associated  with  higher  interest  payments
and  lower  values  of the  stock  of real  debt.  In  a  world  free  of money
illusion,  bondholders  perceive  the  increase  in disposable  income  (due
to  higher  interest  payments)  as a compensation  for  the  decline  in their
real  wealth  (due  to the  lower  value  of their  bonds). Thus,  they  do not
consume  the  additional  income  but  restore  the  value  of their  initial
wealth  by buying  new  government  bonds.- 16 -
Substituting  equations  (19)  bad  (20)  into (18)
we finally  arrive  at
6-:-  t+  (r-q)  p  +(r +  e - q)#  - (q  + f-)  +  +  (21)
y
A convenient  starting  hypothesis  is to assume  that  the  government  is
interested  in  stabilizing  the  ratio  of domestic  and  external  debt  to GDP.
Thus,  we may  set  -"  -0,  and  derive  the  value  of the  deficit  that  would
correspond  to a  constant  debt/GDP  ratio.
The  resulting  equation  suggests  the  relationship  between  the  primary
deficit,  (g-t)/y,  the  ratios  of domestic  and  foreign  debt  to GDP, O  and  #, and
the  revenues  from  monetization,  (q  +  I  - 0)p,  se!gnorage  and  the '.flation
tax. The inflation  tax (ir)  measures  the  revenues  obtained  as economic  agents
attempt  to  keep  their  money  balances  constant,  in real  terms,  as inflation
increases. Seignorage  (q-6)p  measures  the  revenues  obtained  as economic
agents  increase  their  real  stock  of base  money  as real  GDP  rises. These
variables  are  linked  through  the  following  relationship:
*  I
g  - t  - (q  +  1r - O)p  - t(r-q)p  +  (r  +  e-q)O]  (22)
y
According  to equation  (22)  the  ability  of the  government  to extract
real  resources  through  monetization  (the  first  term  of the  right-hand  side  of
the  equation),  is  mitigated  by the  servicing  requirements  of the  domestic  and
foreign  debt (the  last  two  terms  of the  right-hand  side  of the  equation).
Those,  in turn,  are  influenced  by three  factors:  the  real  interest  rate,  the- 17  -
growth  rate,  and  the  real  exchange  rate  changes. It  is clear  that  the  higher
the  domestic  and  foreign  interest  rate  compared  to the  economy's  growth  rate,
the  less  the  available  room  for  maneuver  in the  primary  deficit. Similarly,  a
real  exchange  rate  depreciation,  which  raises  the  real  cost  of servicing  the
external  debt,  limits  the  scope  of  non-interest  government  spending. However,
as long  as the  monetization  of the  economy  (in  real  terms)  exceeds  the
servicing  requirements  of the  domestic  and  external  debt,  the  government  may
continue  to run  a primary  deficit.
Equation  (22)  can  be rewritten  as:
*  A
(g  - t) + (r  - q)  p + (  r  + e - q)  0  (q  +  G)  /A  (22')
y
The  financeable  deficit,  i.e.  the  sustainable  operational  deficit  (on
the left-hand  side)  is  the  one  consistent  with a level  of domestic  and  foreign
financing  that  keep  the  debt/output  ratios  constant  and  with the  monetization
revenues  calculated  at target  inflation  and  output  growth  rates.
Another  way of looking  at equation  (21)  is  to determine  what  would  be
the "warranted"  rate  of growth  in  order  to stabilize  the  debt/GDP  ratio.
Assuming  the  existence  of a "structural" budget  deficit,  at least  over  the
medium  term,  the  question  is  whether  the  stabilization  objective  can  be
achieved  through  "expansionary  adjustment",  i.e.  by an  expansionary  strategy
that  would  generate  the  additional  resources  required  for  the  servicing  of the
debt. This is  the  essence  of the  argument  behind  the "adjustment  with  growth"
strategy,  which  has recently  become  the  centerpiece  of Structural  Adjustment
lending.- 18  -
Setting  again  0  - - 0, and  solving  for  q  we obtain:
*
q  - [(g  - t)Wy +  rp +  (r  +  e)# - up+  +  Gp]/[+  p  +  (23)
Equation  (23)  states  that  the  rate  of growth  required  for  stabilizing
the  debt-output  ratio  in  the  economy  would  be higher,  the  higher  the  primary
deficit,  the  higher  the interest  payments,  including  the  real  cost from  an
exchange  rate  depreciation  and  the  higher  the  change  in  velocity  for  any  given
inflation  rate. On the  other  hand,  the  required  growth  rate  would  be lower,
the  higher  the  inflation  tax (up)  through  which  the  government  extracts  real
resources. These  are  hardly  surprising  results.
It is also  interesting  to  observe  that  equation  (21)  suggests  a
duality  between  growth  and  inflation  in  extracting  real  resources  for
government. Recalling  that:
*  *  A,  A  *
r  - n-I, r - i-  and  e = E+U-I)
and  solving  for  i we obtains
I - [(g-t)/y  +  (n-q)p +  (i  +  E - q)# - (q-O)#p/(p  +  p  +  #] (24)
where  X' may be termed  the  uwarranted'  inflation  rate  in  stabilizing  the  debt-
output  ratio.- 19 -
The analysis  has ignored  an  explicit  discussion  of the  current
account  of the  balance  of payments. Its  evolution  has  been  implicitly
reflected  in  the  developments  of the  foreign  debt  of Government  and  the  net
foreign  assets  of the  Monetary  Authority. Although  the  sustainability  of the
current  account  is  a  very important  issue,  it  is  not included  here,  because  an
empirical  application  would  have required  information  on the  foreign  sector
activities  of government,  which  is  not  readily  available. However,  for
purposes  of completeness,  Appendix  I  presents  a  theoretical  extension  of the
model  that  focuses  on the  current  account  of the  government  sector.- 20 -
IV.  AN EMPIRICAL  INVESTIGATION  :  THE  CASE  OF KENYA  AND  GHANA
There  is currently  a  major  research  effort  aiming  at identifying  the
interaction  among  inflation,  relative  price  changes  and  fiscal  adjustment  in
Africa.10/  The  project,  which  aspires  to develop  a general  approach  to  the
adjustment  process  in  Africa,  incorporates  four  elements:  (a)  fiscal  and
monetary  policy;  (b)  external  policies;  (c)  price  controls  and  subsidies;  and
(d) wage policy. As part  of that  project,  a  paper  by Chhibber  et al (1989)
has already  identified,  inter  alia,  the  effects  of individual  prices  on
different  budget  items  in  Zimbabwe.
The  conceptual  framework  developed  in  this  paper  could  provide  a
useful  background  for  the  kind  of analysis  presented  for  Zimbabwe,  which  is
also  expected  to be applied  to three  more  African  countries.ll/  The  most
interesting  question  would  be to  determine  the  relationship  between  the  actual
deficit,  and  the  sustainable  financeable  deficit,  which  is  determined  by
seignorage  and  the  inflation  tax  extracted  by the  government  through
monetization.  The  combination  of  the  two  approaches  would  establish  a
comprehensive  investigation  of fiscal  adjustment  in  Africa,  from  which
valuable  conclusions  could  be drawn.
10/  The  research  proposal  was  prepared  by CEC  and  AF6.  For  a review  of
recent  experience  see  O'Connel  (1988).
11/  Those  ares  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Malawi  and  Ghana.- 21 -
This  part  shows  how  the  conceptual  framework  presented  earlier  could
be applied  in  practice. The  investigation  focuses  on two  African
countries,  Kenya  and  Ghana,  in  two  periods:  1980-1987,  during  which
fiscal  policy  is reviewed  in  a historical  perspective,  and 1988-1991,
for  which  a forecast  simulation  is  attempted. The  next  section
describes  in detail  the  purpose  of the  empirical  investigation  and
explains  the  main  methodological  steps.  Sections  3 and  4  present  the
empirical results  for  Kenya  and  Ghana,  respectively,  after  a  brief
description  of  economic  developments  in  the  respective  country.
1.  Purpose  of empirical  investiaation  and  description  of
methodology.
The  purpose  of  the  empirical  application  of the  model  is to apply  the
methodology  developed  earlier  in two  ways:  first,  from  the  viewpoint  of  past
economic  developments  in connection  with typical  fiscal  policy  options  facing
the  decision-maker.  Second,  in  the  context  of a  macroeconomic  and  fiscal
framework  of  projections  and  targets. In  other  words,  the  model  may be  used
both  to evaluate  the  consistency  of fiscal  policy  ia  the  past  ar.d  to check  the
consistency  between  targets  and  policy  variables  in  the  future. The  empirical
application  presented  here  is  basically  a  quantification  of  macroeconomic
identities.  There  are  no behavioral  equations  to support  the  interface
between  macroeconomic  variables  and  no econometric  estimation  of  behavioral
relationships.  This  has  the following  implication:  whereas  the  historical- 22 -
data  will necessarily  indicate  an  objective  relationship  between actual
and  'desirable"  variables,  the  future  simulations  are  based  on
"targets'  and  assumptions,  which  have  been  estimated  elsewhere. Their
compatibility,  therefore,  (or  lack  thereof)  is  not  checked  by the
model.  For  that  reason,  a second  set  of  projections  for  1988-91  is
presented,  in  which  the fiscal  target  is taken  as given,  but  the  two
basic  macroeconomic  variables  (namely,  the  inflatior.  and  the  growth
rates)  are  determined  simultaneously  by the  model  and  are  checked  against  the
original  assumptions.  The  overall  policy  objective,  which  underlies  all
calculations  presented  here,  is  the  stabilization  of the  debt-output  ratio.
The  basic  methodological  steps  are  as follows: For  the  historiual
period  (1980-87),  the  model  estimates  the  sustainable  operational  deficit  of
the  monetary  authority,  i.e.  the  maximum  financeable  deficit  for  stabilizing
the  debt-output  ratio. As equation  (22')  suggests,  this  concept  is
equivalent  to the  monetization  of the  deficit,  (q-r-0)p,  and  is  equal  to the
sum  of seignorage,  (q-0)p,  and  the  inflation  tax,  J/S.  This  calculation  is
based  on the  actual  growth  and  inflation  rates  for  that  period. Next,  the
model  estimates  the  warranted  growth  and  inflation  rates,  i.e.  the  rates  which
would  have  been  required  to stabilize  the  debt/output  ratio  (equations  (23)
and (24)1.  These  calculations  are  based  on the  actual  operational  deficit
calculated  over  the  same  period. The  sustainable  operational  deficit,  and  the
warranted  growth  and  inflation  rates  are  subsequently  compared  with their
corresponding  actual  values  to assess  the  implied  policy  deviations  from  the
desirable  strategy.- 23 -
The  simulations  for  the  period  1988-1991  reflect  two  different
approaches. In  the  first,  a  consistent  fiscal  framework  is developed
based  on  projected  interest  payments  and  on growth  and  inflation
targets  provided  by  World  Bank reports,  as  well as  on a few
simplifying  working  assumptions.  The  sustainable  operational  deficit  is
calculated  first. Subsequently,  the  central  government  cash  deficit  is
estimated. The latter  is  then  compared  with  the  projected  cash  deficit  by the
World  Bank  over  the  same  time  period.
The  second  approach  develops  a consistent  macroeconomic  framework.
Under  this  approach,  the  basic  assumptions  are  the  ratio  of budget  interest
payments  to GDP  and  the  projected  cash  deficit,  also  as  a percent  of GDP.
The  model  then estimates  simultaneously  the  warranted  growth  and  inflation
rates  for  stabilizing  the  debt/output  ratio,  and  compares  them  with the  World
Bank  projections  for  the  same  period. As equations  (23)  and (24)  suggest,  in
this  model  growth  and  inflation  play identical  roles,  in  so far  as
they  extract  real  resources  for  government  for  the  servicing  of its
debt. But  there  is no  behavioral  model  linking  growth  (or  employment,
or output)  with inflation  and,  consequently,  it  is not  possible  to draw
conclusions  about  an explicit  policy  tradeoff.
The results  of these  calculations  are  presented  in  the  next  two
sections. All calculations  are  carried  out  in discrete  terms. By convention,
a  negative  fiscal  balance  represents  a deficit  and  a  positive  balance  a
surplus.- 24  -
2.  KENYA
a. Background
Following  the  coffee  boom  in  the  late  19709,  during  which  foreign
reserves  increased  by 601  and  domestic  liquidity  expanded  dramatica1ly,  Kenya
experienced  a deterioration  in its  domestic  and  external  imbalances.  Between
1980  and  1981  the  fiscal  deficit  as a  percent  of  GDP doubled,  and  so did  the
inflation  rate  between  1980  and  1982. The  measures  adopted  by the  Government
(sales  of Government  securities  and  an increase  in  banks'  liquidity  ratio)
proved  insufficient  to sterilize  the  monetary  base  created  by the  rising
foreign  reserves  and  the  enlarged  fiscal  deficit. The  subsequent  sharp  drop
in  coffee  prices  and  an  overvalued  exchange  rate  were the  main causes  of the
worsening  in the  current  account  deficit  and  of a dramatic  fall  in foreign
reserves.
The  period  1980-1987  was  characterized  by instability  and  by serious
internal  and  external  imbalances  but  the  economy  continued  to expand  at an
average  rate  of 3.7  percent. In 1986,  thanks  to a second  boom  in coffee
prices,  the  external  position  of the  country  improved  considerably  and  the
balance  of payments  recorded  a surplus. All this  changed  in 1987,  as  the
price  of coffee  in international  markets  dropped  and  Kenya's  external  terms  of
trade  worsened  by 18Z. Despite  the  newly  reintroduced  import  restric.ions  the- 25 -
current  account  deficit  jumped  from  1%  of GDP  in 1986  to 6.2%  in 1987  and,  by
the  end  of the  year,  foreign  exchange  reserves  could  cover  less  than  sev2n
weeks  of imports  of goods  and  services.
Kenya's  growth  prospects  are  cloutded  by the  fiscal  imbalances  of the
recent  past  and  the  creeping  growth  of the  debt/GDP  ratio. As Table  1  shows,
the ratio  of cash  deficit  to  GDP,  after  a  two-year  decline  between  1981  and
1983  rose  again  during  1984-1987.  There  have  been exceptional  reasons  for
this  unsatisfactory  performance:  in 1984  Kenya  was struck  by the  most severe
drought  in  50 years  and  expansionary  fiscal  policies  had  to be adopted  in
order  to assist  the  affected  areas  and  help  the  population. Public
expenditure  kept  rising  at a faster  pace  than  revenues  even  in 1986  and  1987,
when good  weather  conditions  and  favorable  prices  for  export  crops  supported
the  economic  recovery  of the  country.
The  behavior  of the  primary  deficit,  vis-a-vis  the  cash  deficit,
shows  that  interest  payments  have  claimed  a  very important  share  of total
expenditure  in recent  years. From  1984  to 1988  total.  interest  payments
increased  by 1202;  during  this  period  domestic  and  foreign  interest  payments
have  risen  by 1322  and  78%,  respectively.  This  rapid  growth  in  the  debt
interest  overhang  was caused  by a declining  inflation  rate,  which  has resulted
in  higher  real  interest  rates,  and  by growing  nominal  deficits  financed  by
borrowing.
The  medium-term  fiscal  prospects  (1988-1991)  call  for  a gradual
reduction  of the  central  government  fiscal  deficit  from  -4.2  percent  of GDP in
1988  to -3.5  percent  of GDP in 1991. This  reflects  a containment  of- 26 -
expenditure  to about  29.5  percent  of  GDP,  and  a  marginal  rise  in  revenue  from
25.2  percent  in 1988  to 25.9  percent  of  GDP in 1991. However,  interest
payments  are  projected  to remain  at  over  5 percent  of GDP  throughout  the
period. On the  whole,  the  basic  question  is  whether  the  macroeconomic  and
fiscal  projections  are  compatible  with a stabilization  of the  debt/GDP  ratio
over  the  medium-term.
b. Empirical  results
Table  1  and  Graph  1  present  the  three  fundamental  concepts  of the
fiscal  deficit  in  Kenya  for  the  Central  Government  and  the  Monetary
Authority between  1980  and  1987. The  cash  and  operational  deficits
of the  respective  agencies  are  very  similar,  implying  that  a  consolidation  of
the  accounts  between  the  Central  Government  and  the  Central  Bank  adds  little
extra  information.  In  the  case  of Kenya  this  is  expected  to  be the  case,
since  Central  Bank  profits  are  transferred  to the  budget. The  primary
deficit  is  by definition  identical,  since  it  excludes  interest
payments  and receipts  on foreign  liabilities  and  assets. The  most
interesting  result  is  that  in  several  years  during  the  1980s  the  operational
deficit  was lower  than  the  primary  deficit. In  some  cases,  e.g.,  1980  and
1981,  this  was due  to substantially  negative  real  interest  rates;  in  others,
e.g. 1984  and 1985,  it  was due  to  a considerable  appreciation  of  the real
exchange  rate,  which  effectively  turned  budget  interest  costs  negative  in  real
terms.TArLE  *1.  KAYA  BASITC  FISCAL  INDITCATORS
(Fiscal  Years)
1980-1987
1111 1112  IRfi  iRMA  1984  11  1212  -Averau
(in  percent  of  COP)
Centrnl  Cov-rnwnt
Cauh Deficit  -6.0  -9.6  -6.  -3.6  -3.9  -6.1  -6.4  -7.6  -6.8
Operational  Deficit  0.6  -5.6  -3.2  2.2  1.9  4.0  -o.8  -8.3  -0.9
Primary  Deficit  -3.1  -7.1  -2.9  0.3  5.2  -5.9  -O.5  -2.9  -2.1
Uonetarv  Authority  1/
Cash Deficit  -4.7  -9.4  -0.6  -3.7  -3.8  -6.1  -6.4  -7.8  -5.8
Operational  Deficit  -o.3  -6.7  -a.o  2.4  1.8  3.2  -O.6  -8.1  -1.0
Primary Deficit  -3.1  -7.1  -2.9  o.3  0.2  -0.9  -4.6  -2.9  -2.1
(in  percent)
M,moranduu  Itmi
UWP  Growth  Rate  6.7  4.6  3.0  1.6  1.6  3.1  S.O  6.4  3.7
Average  Nominal Domestic
Interest  Rate  3.4  4.7  11.9  14.9  14.4  14.0  16.1  14.2  11.7
Domestic  Inflation  Rate  10.6  12.7  17.7  18.0  11.6  9.9  8.1  8.4  11.9
Change  In Real  Effoctive
Exchange  Rate  2/  -3.0  -1.9  -1.6  1.3  0.0  8.8  -12.6  -9.3  -2.6
Debt/COP  3/  36.4  39.0  42.8  44.2  44.4  46.3  48.1  48.9  43.6
1/  Consolidated accounts of  Central  Govornment  and  Control  Bank  in  respect  of  holding of  lnternational  roserveS and
positions  vis-a-vis  the  IMF.
2/  A negative  sign  signifies  depreciation.  A positivo  sign  signifies  appreclation.
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Table  2 shows  the  derivation  of the  sustainable  operational  deficit
for 1980-87. On average,  the  actual  operational  deficit  was -1.0  percent  of
GDP,  whereas  the  estimated  sustainable  deficit  was only  -0.2  percent.
As column  5 indicates,  stabilization  of the  debt/GDP  ratio  would  have
required  a  much stronger  fiscal  adjustment  during  the first  years  of
the  decade  than  during  the latter  period. At the  same  time,  the  data
reveal  that in 1983,  1984  and 1985  the  government  actually  had  a substantial
room  for  maneuver equivalent  to 3.3, 1.0  and  3.6  percent  of GDP  in
the  respective years. On average,  between  1980  -1987  the required
deficit  reduction  amounted  to  under  1  percent  of GDP.
Table  2 also  shows  calculations  of the 'warranted"  growth  and
inflation  rates,  for  the  years  1980-1987.  On average,  the  actual
growth  rate  was virtually  identical  to the  required  level  that  would  have
stabilized  the  debt/GDP  ratio  in  the  Kenyan  economy,  given  its  actual  fiscal
performance. On  the  contrary,  the  government  could  have  achieved  the
stabilization  goal  with less  inflationary  finance;  the  data  show  that  the
debt/GDP  objective  could  have  been  achieved  with a reduction  of the  average
inflation  rate  by 2.6  percentage  points. Although  the  data  in  table  2 also
show  the  annual  developments  in the  growth  and  inflation  rates,  a year-by-year
point  comparison  would  probably  be misleading,  due  to the
fluctuations  in the  variables,  which  in  turn  are  due  to the  arbitrary
definition  of the  time  periods  and  the  data  collection  process. For
that reason,  averages  provide  a  better  clue  towards  answering  the
basic  question.TABLE  2.  KENYA: FISCAL  POLICY  CONCEPTS  AND  MACROECNONMIC  VARIABLES
(in  percent  of  CNW)  (in  percent)
Inf I-  Sustainablo  Actual  Required,  Warranted  Actual  Iplied  Warranted  Actual  Implied
FiCal  tton  Sl-  Operational  Operational  Deficit  Growth  Growth  Growth  Inflation  Inflation  Inflation
Years  Tax  1/  gnorrgo 1/  Deficit  1/  Deficit  1/  Reduction  2/  Rate  Rate  Differontial  3/ Rate  Rate  Differetial  4/
(1)  (2)  (3)-E(1).(2)]  (4)  (6)=(3)-(4)  (6)  (7)  (8)a(6)-(M)  (9)  (1)  (11)-(9)-(18)
1980  0.3  0.2  -1.3  -3.3  -3.7  -3.1  6.7  -6.8  6.3  10.6  -C.3
1981  1.1  -1.9  0.8  -6.7  6e8  14.9  4.6  1*.,  20.6  12.7  9.1
1992  1.4  -2.3  0.9  -3.o  4.1  4.8  3.o  1.3  11.3  17.7  -5.9
1983  1.3  -0.9  -3.6  2.4  -3.3  -7.3  1.5  -8.6  -3.1  13.0  -13.1
1984  3.9  -1.9  1.0  1.8  -1.0  036  1.5  -1.0  5.6  11.6  -6.3
1986  0.7  -4.6  -3.1  3.2  -3.6  -1.9  3.1  -65.  2.9  9.9  -7.3
1966  3.5  -1.1  -4.4  -3.6  0.1  9.1  5.0  4.1  14.3  8.1  6.2  i
1987  0.4  1.6  -1.9  -6.1  4.9  10.1  5.4  4.7  13.4  6.4  6.9
1983-1987
Avorage  0.9  -O.6  -3.2  -1.0  0.9  3.3  3.7  3.1  9.3  11.9  -2.6
1/  Monotary authority  doeinition.  Soe  footnote  1,  Table  1.
2/  A negative  numr  indicates  permissible  deficit  incroseo.
3/ A positive  number  Indicates  required  growth  incrrose.  A negative  number  indicates  permissible  growth decline.
4/  A positive  numr  Indicates  requird  Inflation  Incrnose.  A negotive  numbor  indicates  permissible  inflation  decline.- 31  -
Table  3  and  Graph  2 show  the  results  of simulations  for  the  period
1988-1991  with a  view  to obtaining  a fiscal  policy  framework  consistent
with the  objective  of debt/GDP  stabilization.  The  simulations  are
based  on  World  Bank  projections  for  the  ratio  of budget  interest
payments  to GDP  and  for  the inflation  and  growth  rates. 121  The  model
assumes  no change  in the  income  velocity  of reserve  money  and  no
change  in  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  over  the  period. The
results  indicate  that  the  sustainable  governament  cash  deficit  is
slightly  lower  than  the  projected  deficit,  implying  a somewhat
greater  fiscal  effort  to  achieve  the  stabilization  goal.  The
required  average  deficit  reduction  over  the  period  is  0.9  percent  of
GDP.
Table  4 looks  at the  same  issue  by asking  a  different  question:
suppose  that  the  government  wishes  to adhere  to the  projected  cash  deficit,
and further  suppose  that  the  interest  payments  assumption  turns  out  correct;
what  would  be the  growth  and inflation  rates  required  to achieve  a  constant
debt/GDP  ratio? The fundamental  difference  between  this  and  the  earlier
calculation  is  that  here  the  warranted  growth  and  inflation  rates  (as  well as
the  implied  monetary  base,  the inflation  tax  and  seignorage)  are  all
calculated  simultaneously.  In  this  respect,  the  results  of Table  4  are
internally  consistent.  Note,  however,  that  there  is  still  a lack  of a
behavioral  framework  that  would  provide  an  unequivocal  answer  to the
12/  Kenya:  Public  Expenditure  Review,  Main  Report  and  Annex  Volume,  Report
7508-KE,  November  21,  1988.TABLE  8.  KENYA: A CONSISTENT  FISCAL POLICY  FRAMEWORK
Assumptions
Real  Effective
Interest  Inflation  Crowth  Change  in  Exchange  Rat.
Payments  Rate  Rate  Velocity  Depreciation
(X  of  GDP)  (%)  (X)  (X)  (U)
1988  6.2  8.0  6.0  03.  9.0
1989  5.6  7.0  5.6  00e  0.0
1990  5.8  6.0  5.6  0.0  0.9
1991  5.3  5.6  5.0  6.6  6.e
Projections
(in  percent  of  CDP)
Sustainable  Sustainable  Sustainable  Target  Roquired
Inflation  Mon.  Authority  Primary  Gov't  Cash  Gov't  Cash  Deficit
Tax  Soignorage  Operational  Deficit  Deficit  Deficit  Deficit  Reduction
(1)  (2)  (3)=-((1)+(2)]  (4)  (S)  (6)  (7)=(6)-(6)
1988  0.6  -0.2  -0.4  1.3  -3.9  -4.2  0.3
1989  0.6  -0.2  -0.4  2.1  -3.4  -4.6  1.1
1990  0.6  -0.1  -0.4  2.4  -2.9  -4.0  1.1
1991  0.4  0.0  -0.4  2.7  -2.6  -3.6  0.9
1988-1991  0.6  -0.1  -0.4  2.1  -3.2  -4.1  0.9
AverageKENYA:  DEFICIT  PROJECTIONS
1988 1991
2 -
IB Required  Adjust.
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choice  of policy  objectives.  The  results  of table  4,  also  depicted  in  Graphs
3 and  4, show  that,  to the  extent  that  the  World  Bank  growth  and  inflation
projections  are  consistent,  the  stabilization  objective  can  be achieved  during
1988-1991  with a lower  rate  for  both inflation  and  growth. This is  true
both  on average,  and  on a year-to-year  basis. In  other  words,  if  taken
literally,  the  Bank  projections  suggest  that  the  performance  of the  Kenyan
economy  in  the  next  four  years  will result  in a substantial  decline  of its
debt/GDP  ratio. From  the  methodological  point  of  view,  the "warranted'  growth
and  inflation  rates  of table  4  set  the  benchmarks  against  which  any
behaviorally  consistent  combination  of those  variables  can  be  weighed.
3.  GHANA
a.  Background
Both  adverse  external  developments  and  prolonged  inappropriate
domestic  policies  caused  an extended  deterioration  in  the  Ghanaian  economy
during  the  late  70s  and  early  80s. The  effects  of a  worsening  in  the  external
terms  of trade,  a  succession  of severe  droughts  and  the  influx  of emigrant
workers  returning  from  Nigeria  were compounded  by a  highly  overvalued  exchange
rate  and  misaligned  domestic  prices. By 1982,  real  per capita  income  was
lower  than  in 1970  by 30 percent,  real  export  earnings  by 52  percent,  and
import  volumes  by 30  percent.TABLE  4.  KENYA:  A CONSISTENT  MACROECONOMIC  FRAMEWORK
Assumptions
Real  Effective
Interest  Gov't  Cash  Change  in  Exchange  Rate
Payments  Deficit  Velocity  Depreciation
(X  of  GNP)  (X  of  CNP)  (X)  (1)
1988  6.5  -4.2  0.0  6.0
1989  6.2  -4.5  0.0  6.0
1990  6.3  -4.0  0.0  0.0
1991  6.3  -3.6  0.0  6.o
Projections
(in  percent)
Warr.  ted  Targot  Growth  Warranted  Target  Inflation
Growth  Rate  Growth  Rate  Differential  1/  Inflation  Rate  Inflation  Rato Differential  2/
(1)  (2)  (3)=(1)-(2)  (4)  5)  (6)=(4)-(6)
1988  1.2  5.6  -3.8  1.2  8.0  -6.8
1989  1.9  6.0  -3.1  i.9  7.  0  -5.1
1990  1.1  5.0  -3.9  1.1  6.0  -4.8
1991  0.6  6.0  -4.4  6.6  5.6  -4.4
1988-1991
Average  1.2  5.6  -3.8  1.2  6.5  -5.3
1/  A positive  number  indicates  required  growth  Increase.  A negative  number  Indicates  poraissible  growth
decline.
2/ A positive  number  indic&.es  required  inflation  increase.  A negative  number  indicates  permissible  inflation
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In 1983  the  Government  embarked  on a  three-year  economic  recovery
program  supported  by resources  from  the  IMF,  the  World  Bank  and  various
donors.  The  aim  of the  reforms  was to restructure  relative  prices,  to
liberalize  imports,  and  to restore  monetary  and  fiscal  discipline. The  main
instruments  were a drastic  devaluation  and  an increase  in  official  producer
prices,  notably  for  cocoa. The  program  was very  successful  in  many respects.
It succeeded  ir  arresting  the  prolonged  economic  decline,  reducing  inflation,
containing  the  balance  of payments  deficit,  and  closing  the  gap  between  the
parallel  and  the  official  exchange  rates. At the  same  time,  the  Government
recognized  the  structural  nature  of  many  problems  besetting  the  economy,  and
in 1987-88  decided  to formulate  policies  aiming  at enhancing  the  process  of
structural  adjustment.  These  policies  included  new  adjustments  in
administered  prices,  a 23 percent  real  effective  exchange  rate  devaluation  in
1987,  and  a 30  percent  across-the-board  increase  for  civil  servants  in the
1988  budget. Interest  rates  were also  liberalized,  as  were the  controls  on
the  sectoral  distribution  of credit.
The  medium  term  objectives  of the  Government are  principally
the  achievement  of an average  GDP  growth  rate  of at least  5 percent,
the  raising  of the investment  ratio  from  about  13  percent  to 16
percent,  and  a  more  efficient  public  resource  use  coupled  with
improved  income  distribution.  To attain  these  objectives,  emphasis
will be placed  on improved  incentives  for  export  promotion  and  import
substitution,  on increasing  domestic  resource  stabilization  through
tax reform,  and  on a comprehensive  restructuring  of  the financial
sector.- 39 -
On the fiscal  side,  the  principal  aim  is to generate  a budget  surplus
(excluding  capital  expenditure  financed  through  external  project  aid),  in
order  to allow  Government  to  make  net  repayments  to the  domestic  banking
system  between  1988-91. The interesting  question,  therefore,  is  whether  the
parameters  of the  macroeconomic  framework  over  the  next four  years  support  or
not  the expectations  of a decline  in the  debt/output  ratio.
b. Empirical  results
Table  5 and  Graph  5 present  the  three  concepts  of deficit  for  the
Central  Government  and  the  Monetary  Authority  over 1980-1987.  The  salient
results  are  two: First,  the  difference  between  the  accounts  of the  two
authorities  is  minimal,  a fact  that  mainly  reflects  the  negligible  amount  of
foreign  reserves  in  Ghana  during  that  period. Second,  the  operational  deficit
was in  most  years  lower  than  the  primary  deficit. In fact,  on average  the
operational  balance  was in  surplus  over  the  period. This  reflects  very  high
surpluses  in the  beginning  of the  period  as  a result  of the  strong  cedi
appreciation,  and  in general  very  low  interest  costs  throughout  the  period  due
to the  substantially  negative  real  interest  rates. Only  in  three  years  (1984,
1986  and 1987)  was the  operational  deficit  higher  than  the  primary  deficit,  as
a result  of a strong  negative  influence  of a real  exchange  rate  devaluation.
In 1984,  when the  cedi  was devalued  by over  60 percent  in real  terms,  the
operational  deficit  was even  higher  than  the  cash  deficit. This  interesting
result  suggests  that  the  real  costs  of the  economy  for  servicing  the  external
debt  were  not adequately  reflected  in  the  cash  operations  of the  budget.TABLE  5.  GHANA: BASIC FISCAL INDICATORS
(Calendar  Years)
1980-1987
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1988  1987  Avorage
(In  percont  of  CDP)
Central Government
Cash  Deficit  -8.0  -6.4  -4.7  -2.7  -2.1  -2.7  -0.7  -0.3  -3.5
Operational  Deficit  0.8  5.5  -0.4  4.6  -4.5  -0.4  0.6  -0.4  0.7
Primary  Deficit  -6.0  -4.3  -2.1  -1.5  -0.9  -1.2  1.6  1.2  -1.7
Monotary  Authority  1/
______________________
Cash  Deficit  -8.0  -6.4  -4.7  -2.7  -2.1  -2.7  -0.6  -0.1  -3.4
Operational  Deficit  0.8  6.2  -0.1  4.6  -4.7  -0.4  0.8  0.1  0.9
Primary  Deficit  -6.0  -4.3  -2.1  -1.5  -0.9  -1.2  1.5  1.2  -1.7
Memorandum  Items  (in  percent)
CDP  Growth Rate  1.1  -3.6  -6.9  -4.6  8.9  5.1  6.2  4.8  1.3
Average  Nominal
Domestic  Interest  Rate  10.8  14.2  14.0  8.9  4.9  S.4  12.3  13.1  10.5
Domestic  Inflation  Rate  60.2  116.0  22.0  122.0  40.0  10.0  25.0  40.0  63.2
Change in  Roal  Effective
Exchange Rate 2/  30.7  122.4  25.0  -32.8  -61.4  -27.3  -42.4  -22.8-.  -1.1
Debt/CDP 3/  24.6  22.0  24.9  18.7  26.6  29.8  31.5  36.6  26.8
1/  Consolidated  accounts  of  Central  Government and  Central  Bank in  rospoct  of  holdings  of  international  reservos
and positions  vis-a-vis  the  IMF.
2/  A negative  sign  signifies  depreciation.  A positive  sign  signifies  appreciLtion.












1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Calendar  Years- 42 -
Table  6  presents  the  sustainable  and  actual  operational  deficit
and  the  warranted and  actual  rates  of growth  and  inflation  for  the  period
1980-1987.  Between  1980-1984  the  sustainable  operational  balance  was  actually
in  surplus,  then  turned  into  a deficit  during  the last  three  years,  primarily
as a result of the  recovered  growth  rate. In contrast,  the  actual
operational  balance  showed  considerable  variation  during  the  same  period  but,
on average,  it  turned  out  very  close  to  the  sustainable  deficit  at just  under
1  percent  of GDP.  Not  surprisingly,  1984-the  year  of the  Great  Devaluation-
stands  out  as the  period  during  which  the  budget  deficit  would  have  required  a
drastic  reduction  in its  non-interest  expenditures  to secure  the resources
necessary  to finance  the  public  debt.
Table  6 also  shows  the  combination  of growth  or inflation  rates  that
would  have achieved  the  same  stabilization  goal  in  the  presence  of actual
fiscal  developments.  The  warranted  growth  and inflation  rates  reflect  the
wide variations  experienced  by the  Ghanaian  economy  in  both its  real  and
financial  variables  during  a  period  of severe  recession  in  the  early  80s,
followed  by recovery  and  significant  changes  in  relative  prices  in the  past
few  years. The  most interesting  result  of the  table  is the  asymmetry  between
growth  and  inflation  in  extracting  real  resources  for  the  government. For  the
period  as a  whole,  the  implied  growth  differential  is  marginally  negative,
suggesting  that  the  average  performance  of the  Ghanian  economy  on the  real
side  would  have  been adequate  to achieve  the  stabilization  of the  debt/output
ratio. On the  other  hand,  the  implied  inflation  differential  is  highly
negative,  indicating  that  the  real  loss  to government  from  a  potentially  lower
inflation  rate  would  have  still  been  outweighed  by the  gains  from  real  growth,
however  small. This asymmetry  is  due  to the  fact  that  the  marginal  growth  ofTABLE  S.  GHANA:  FISCAL  POLICY  CONCEPTS  AND  MACROECONOMIC  VARIABLES
(in  percent of  CDP)  (in  percent)
Infla-  Sustainable  Actual  Required  Warranted  Actual  Iplied  Warranted  Actual  la-ple:
Calandor tion  Sel-  Operational  Operationol Deficit  Growth  Growth  Growth  Inflation  Inflation  Inflation
Years  Tax 1/  gnorage  1/ Deficit  I/  Deficit  1/  Reduction  2/  Rate  Rate  Differential  3/  Rate  Rate  Differenti.1  4/
(1)  (2)  (3)-((1)+(2)]  (4)  (5)=(3)-(4)  (6)  (7)  (S)9(6)-(7)  (9)  (IS)  (11)2(9)-  lO)
1980  7.7  -10.6  2.9  9.8  2.1  2.7  1.1  1.6  28.3  6t.2  -21.b
1981  19.6  -23.2  3.4  6.2  -2.8  -a8.1  -3.5  -34.6  3a.7  116.6  -8S.3
1  2  2.8  -6.2  2.4  -0.1  2.6  7.4  -O  9  14.3  25.3  22.0  3.i
1933  1.60  -17.6  2.5  4.0  -2.1  -24.3  -4.6  -19.7  23.6  122.0  -93.4
1984  3.6  -4.5  1.4  -4.7  6.1  32.6  8.9  23.1  51.2  40.o  11.?
1986  0.7  0.4  -1.1  -4.4  -0.7  12.2  6.1  7.1  21.4  16.6  11.JI
198  1.8  0.6  -1.9  0.6  -2.6  10.4  5.2  5.2  29.6  25.6  4.4
1937  8.t  -2.4  -1.1  0.1  -1.2  6.9  4.3  -3.9  11.2  40.6  -283.
1980-1937
Avoege  6.8  -7.9  1.1  0.9  0.2  0.4  1.3  -9.9  28.3  63.2  -24.
1/ Monetory  authority  definition.  See  footnot  1,  Table  1.
2/ A  negative  number  indicates  permissible  deficiv,  Increase.
3/  A positive  numbr  tndicotes  required  growth Increase.  A negative  number  Indicates  permissible  growth decline.
4/  A positive  number  Indicates  permissible  Inflation  Increase.  A negative  number  Indicates  required  inflation  decline.- 44 -
the  economy  between  1980-1987  was outweighed  by the  real  gains  of goverrnent
due  to the  substantial  negative  real  interest  rates. In general,  year-to-year
variations  are  not  very  meaningful  in  countries  with large  fluctuations,  and
one  should  not  place  confidence  on point  estimates.
Table  7  and  Graph  6  present  a consistent  fiscal  policy  framework  for
Ghana  for  1988-1991. Based  on the  interest  payment,  inflation  and  growth
projections  of the  World  Bank,  13/  the  model  estimates  the  sustainable
operational,  primary  and  cash  deficits  and  compares  the  latter  with the  target
cash  deficit  of Government.  The  sustainable  cash  deficit  is  estimated  on
average  at -2.1  percent  of  GDP  whereas  the  target  cash  surplus  (based  on the
IMF  narrow  definition)  is 1.0  percent  of  GDP.  The  Government,  therefore,
appears  to have  a substantial  room  of  maneuver,  equivalent  to 3.1  percent  of
GDP,  in achieving  its  stabilization  goal  with  a higher  deficit  (or,  more
accurately,  with a deficit  instead  of a surplus),  provided  that  the  growth  and
inflation  forecasts  turn  out  to  be correct.
Table  8 and  Graphs  7 and  8  present  the  results  of a consistent
macroeconomic  framework  for  1988-1991.  In this  case  the  calculations  are
based  on the  broader  definition  of deficit,  which  includes  aid-related  capital
projects. Despite  the  higher  deficit  projections,  the  data  show  that  the
target  growth  rate  is on average  overestimated  by 1.6  percentage  points,  and
13/  See  Ghana:  Country  Economic  Memorandum,  Report  No.7515-GH,  November  23,
1988.- 45 -
the  inflation  rate  by 9.1  percentage  points. Thus,  the  Govern nt again
appears  to  have a significant  leeway  in  achieving  its  debt/GDP  reduction
strategy  with a lower  growth  or inflation  rate  than  the  original  targets. The
actual  policy  tradeoff  would  still  have  to  be determined  through  a behavioral
relationship  between  growth  and  inflation  against  the  benchmark  values




Interest  Inflation  Growth  Change  In  Exchange  Rate
Payments  Rote  Rate  Velocity  Depreciation
(U of  GOP)  (X)  (U)  (X)  (U)
1988  1.2  21.8  656  0.0  0.0
1989  1.2  15.2  6.8  0.0  0.0
1990  1.1  9.1  4.9  0.0  0.0
1991  1.1  5.0  4.9  0.0  0.0
ProJections
(in  percent  of  CDP)
Sustainable
Mon.  Authority Sustainable  Sustainable  Target  Required
Inflation  Operational  Primary  Gov't  Cash  Gov't  Cash  Deficit
Tax  Seignorago  Deficit  Deficit  Deficit  Deficit  Reduction  1/
(1)  (2)  ,  (3)=-E(1)+(2)]  (4)  (5S  (6)  (7)=(5)-(6)
1988  1.9  -1.3  -0.5  -1.7  '-2.9  0.4  -3.3
1989  1.3  -0.8  -0.5  -1.1  -2.3  0.9  -3.2
199W  0.8  -0.4  -0.4  -0.6  -1.7  1.3:  -3.0
1991  0.4  0.0  -0.4  -0.3  -1.4  1.4  -2.8
1988-1991
Average  1.1  -0.8  -0.5  -0.9  -2.1  1.0  -3.1
1/  A negative  number  indicates  permissible  deficit  increase.GHANA:  DEFICIT  PROJECTIONS
1988  -1991
2-
ED  Required  Adjust.









1988  1989  1990  1991
Calendar  YearsTABLE  8.  GHANA: A CONSISTENT  MACROECONOMIC  FRAMEWORK
Assumptions
Real  Effectivo
Interest  Cov't  Cash  Change  In  Exchango  Rate
Payments  Doficit  Volocity  Apprecintion
(S of  GDP)  (X  of  GDP)  ,1/  (X)  (S)
1988  1.2  -3.3  0.°  030
1989  1.2  -3.6  0.0  g.0
1990  1.1  -3.6  0.0  0.0




Warranted  Target  Growth  Warranted  Inflation  Inflation  4
Growth  Rate  Growth  Rate  Differential  2/  Inflation  Rate  Rate  Differential  3/  OD
(1)  (2)  (3)=(1)-(2)  (4)  (6)  (6)=(4)-(5)
_  _  _  ---  - ----------  ---  ______  ---- …  - -
1988  3.2  5.5  -2.3  3.2  21.8  -18.6
1989  3.8  S.8  -2.0  3.8  16.2  -11.4
1996  4.1  4.9  -0.8  4.1  9.1  -5.6
1991  3.6  4.9  -1.4  3.6  650  -1.6
1988-1991
Average  3.7  6.3  -1.6  3.7  12.8  -9.1
1/  IMF  broad definition;  includes  aid-related  capital  expenditures.
2/ A positive  number  indicates  required  growth  Increase.  A negative  number  indicates  perer  .;ible  growth
decline.
3/ A  positive  number  Indicates  required  Inflation  lncrose.  A negative  number  indicates  permissible  Inflation











1988  1989  1990  1991
Fiscal  YearsGHANA:  INFLATION  PROJECTIONS
1988-1991
25 -
20 -1  Inflat.  Differ.
B  Target




0  1F -20 -
0  -2  -
.~~~~~~19819915019
Cu~ ~~~~~~~~~~~Fsa  er
C ~ ~ ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~MW4- 51 -
V. SUMMARY, CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS
This  paper  has  developed  an integrated  framework  relating  four  basic
macroeconomic  variables  tO  three  concepts  of the  fiscal  deficit. The
macroeconomic  variables  are  the  interest  rate,  the  inflation  rate,  the  growth
rate  and  the  real  exchange  rate. The  three  deficit  concepts  are  the  cash (or
observed),  the  primary,  and  the  operational  deficit. Each  concept  serves  a
useful  purpose  Zor  the  evaluation  and  determination  of  macroeconomic  policy,
but  it is the  operational  deficit  that  best  reflects  the  absorption  of real
resources  by government,  and  thus  sets  the  limits  for  the  long-term
sustainability  of fiscal  imbalances.  In the  context  of this  paper,  the  basic
question  was  whether  the  operational  deficit  would  be financeable  without
increasing  the real  debt  burden.
Additionally,  the  paper  has  presented  a  methodology  for  combining  the
fiscal  accounts  with  those  of the  Central  Bank,  thus  deriving  the  balance  of
the  Monetary  Authority  - a concept  that  best  reflects  the "true"  fiscal  stance
of government.  A proper  measurement  of the  Monetary  Authority  operational
deficit  would  be much closer  to the  absorption  of real  resources  by the  public
sector  than  the  cash  deficit  of the  Central  Government.
From  the  analytical  point  of  view,  the  purpose  of the  paper  was
twofold:  first,  to compare  the  "sustaineble'  with the  actual  fiscal  deficit  in
a  historical  perspective. Second,  to check  the  consistency  of fiscal  policy
within  a  pre-defined  macroeconomic  framework  over  the  medium  term.  This  was
attempted  in  two  ways:  first,  by accepting  the  actual  macroeconomic- 52 -
setting  and  comparing  the  observed  (and  in  the  case  of future  simulations,  the
projected)  deficit  with the  sustainable  deficit;  second,  by accepting  the
actual  (or  projected)  deficit,  and  wondering  what the  appropriate  macro-
economic  setting  should  have  been (or  must  be in  the  future). In  both  cases,
the  basic  assumption  was the  stabilization  of total  (domestic  and  external)
debt  to GDP.  14/
The  most important  limitation  of the  paper  is  that  the  model  is
basically  a set  of macroeconomic  identities,  with  no behavioral  content.
Consequently,  the  main  weakness  stemming  from  this limitation  relates  to the
calculation  of the  inflation  tax,  which  is  basically  assumed  to  be a linear
function  of the  monetary  base. As the  monetary  base  is a direct  liability  of
government  vis-a-vis  the  private  sector,  high  and  persistent  inflation
represents  a  direct  capital  gain  for  the  public  sector. Yet, as  with  any
other  tax,  too  high  a tax  rate (in  this  case,  the  rate  of inflation),  leads  to
an  erosion  of the  tax  base:  a  high  inflation  may lead  to a  serious  contraction
of the  monetary  base,  as the  private  sector  reduces  its  demand  for  currency
and  demand  deposits. Such  a  possibility  is  not  allowed  in  this  model. A
second  limitation  is  related  to the  implicit  assumption  made  throughout  the
paper  that  real  interest  rates  are  invariant  with respect  to inflation  or,
equivalently,  that  the  nominal  interest  rate  fully  reflects  inflationary
expectations  in  the  Fisher  equation.15/ To the  extent  that  this  assumption
14/  As already  discussed  this  assumption  was  taken  as a first,  working
hypothesis. In  Kenya,  and  especially  in  Ghana  it  may be desirable  to
reduce  the ratio  of the  debt  to GDP.
15/  For  a further  discussion  of this  point  see  Catsambas  (1988).- 53  -
is  not always  true,  the empirical  conclusions  of the  paper  would almost
certainly  have to  be  modified. More generally,  the  true impact  of
inflationary  financing  or of a serious  devaluation  on the  macroeconomy  can  be
properly  addressed  only if  the  decision-makers  are  in a  position  to assess  the
behavioral  response  of economic  agents  to an integrated  set  of flow  and  stock
variables.
The conceptual  framework  developed  in  part III  was applied  to  Kenya
and  Ghana  over the  period 1980-1987  and  was extended  for  the  period  1988-1991
in  the form  of  medium-term  fiscal  and  macroeconomic  projections. The  problems
encountered  in the  empirical  application  of  the  model  were serious  for  both
countries  and  of a similar  nature. The  most  important  constraint  for  the
proper  application  of the  model  was the inconsistency  encountered  between  the
financing  of the  deficit  and  changes  in  the  stocks  of domestic  and  external
debt.  16/  This  problem  may have  affected  the calculations  of the  historical
period  both  for  the sustainable  operational  deficit  and for  the  warranted
inflation  and  growth  rates.
A second  general  problem  was the lack  of sufficient  information  for
the  proper  calculation  of changes  in  net  worth  of the  Central  Bank.  The
problem  was less  serious  in  the  case  of  Kenya,  where  there  is a  statutory
provision  for  the  transfer  of Central  Bank  profits  to the  budget.  In  the  case
of  Ghana,  where  no similar  provision  exists,  or even  in  Kenya  to  the extent
that  this  issue  has not  been  properly  addressed  in  the official  statistics,
there  is a  possibility  that  the  Monetary  Authority  deficit  may have  still  been
und*restimated  by an  unknown  quantity.
16/  See  Appendix  3 for an  explanation  of  how this  problem  was resolved  for
each  of the two  countries.- 54 -
A third  general  problem  relates  to the  proper  measurement  of the
external  debt. As Anand  and  van  Wijenbergen  (1988)  demonstrate,  cross-
exchange  rate  variations  may have  serious  consequences  for  the  proper
valuation  of debt  denominated  in  various  currencies,  and  they  thus  recommend
the  use  of a  weighted  debt-output  and  debt-exports  ratio,  along  the  lines
suggested  by Cohen  (1986). 17/  Absence  of a detailed  breakdown  of external
debt  statistics  by currency  necessitated  the  use  of the  assumption  that  the
debt  statistics  of  Kenya  and  Ghana  have  properly  and  adequately  incorporated
valuation  changes  resulting  from  dollar  fluctuations  vis-a-vis  other
currencies.
A particular  problem  for  Kenya  was the  use  of fiscal  year  data  in its
budgetary  accounts. The  transformation  of national  income  accounts  data  on a
fiscal  year  basis  through  a simple  arithmetic  average  may  have introduced  a
margin  of error  of unknown  magnitude. This  particular  problem,  as  well as the
more general  one  of  official  data  reporting  in a  timely  and  consistent
fashion,  suggest  that  for  both  countries  it  is  preferable  to focus  on average
statistics  rather  than  on year-to-year  (point)  estimates  during  the  historical
period.
All of these  qualifications  notwithstanding,  the  results  for  the  two
countries  were interesting,  if only  because  of  their  similar  implications.  In
the  case  of Kenya  it appears  that  deficit  developments  between  1980-1987,  and
17/  See  also  Turkey:  External  Debt,  Fiscal  Policy  and  Sustainable  Growth,
volume  I:  The  Main  Report,  September  9, 1988  Report  No.7162-TU,  The
World  Bank.- 55 -
also  the  budget  projections  for  1988-1991,  are  broadly  consistent  with a
general  notion  of stabilization.  Similarly,  the  official  projections  for
growth  and inflation  between  1988-1991  suggest  that,  if the  fiscal  targets  are
adhered  to,  the  basic  stabilization  goal  will  be met  and  probably  overshot.
In the  case  of Ghana,  the  historical  data  show  that  both  the fiscal
balance  and  the  actual  growth  rate  would  have  been  broadly  adequate  to achieve
stabilization.  The  future  projections  parallel  those  of Kenya  insofar  as  they
appear  to  present  the  Government  with substantial  room  of maneuver  for  its
stabilization  goals. Therefore,  even  with  moderate  slippages  on all fronts,
the  Ghanaian  economy  appears  to  be on the  track  of achieving  its  desirable
goal  of net repayments  of its  debt  to the  banking  sector. 18/
The  obvious  suggestions  for  future  research  in  this  area  are,  first,
an extension  of the  conceptual  framework  to incorporate  some  basic  behavioral
relationships  and,  second,  a serious  effort  to improve  on the  consistency
between  stock  and  flow  statistics,  especially  in the  area  of debt  and  budget
financing. It is  also  apparent  that  a deeper  analysis  of the  issues  addressed
in this  paper  would require  a  more  thorough  examination  of fiscal  and  Central
Bank  statistics,  particularly  the  balance  sheet  of the  latter. This  suggests
18/  This  is a somewhat  stretched  statement. Interest  payment  projections
for  both  Kenya  and  Ghana  were  not  available  on a domestic-foreign  debt
breakdown  and,  consequently,  the implied  debt  reduction  cannot,
strictly  speaking,  be attributed  to the  domestic  or the  foreign
component  of the  debt.  This  statement,  therefore,  reflects  more  the
intended  policy  of the  Government  than  a conclusion  based  on data.- 56 -
that  a  comprehensive  investigation  of these  questions  can  probably  not  be
accomplished  except  as  the  focus  of an  ad  hoc  mission  to the  countries  in
question. In the  meantime,  the  present  methodology  could  serve  as an initial
step  for  a broad  consistency  check  on fiscal  policy  within  the  framework  of
growth  with adjustment.- 57 -
Appendix  1
THE  SUSTAINABLE  CURRENT  ACCOUNT  DEFICIT
To bring  the  current  account  deficit  explicitly  into  the  picture,
consider  the following  relationship:
E(CAD)  +  iE(B  - NFA)  - E(B  - NFA)  (A.1)
Equation  (A.1)  states  that  the interest  exclusive  current  account
deficit  (CAD)  plus  net  interest  payments  equal  the  change  in the  net  foreign
liabilities  of the  public  sector,  i.e.  the  difference  between  the  foreign
debt,  B ,  and  net foreign  assets,  NFA.
In real  terms  equation  (A..)  is equivalent  to:
F
ec  +  ief  - e -*  (A.2)
p
CAD  *  EP  F
where  c - -- *, F  - B - NFA,  e  --  and  f - -*
Since  - =  f  +  X  f,  equation  (A.2)  may be rewritten  as
ec  +  er f  - ef  (A.3)- 58  -
*  *
where r  - i  - r  is the  real  foreign  interest  rate. Furthermore,  using  the
identity:
*  . A
ef  =  (e*f)  - efe  (A.4)
equation  (A.3)  may  be expressed  as:
ec  +  e(r  +  e)f  (e  f)  (A.5)
A  e
where  e a  - is the  real  exchange  rate.
e
To derive  this  expression  in  terms  of output  shares  define
ec  ef
7  -- ,  #  =  --  ,  where  y is  real  output. Therefore,
y  y
*  (e  f)
7  +  (r  + e)  - =  -- __  (A.5')
y
(e  f)
But(----  =  + + fq  (A.6)
y
Substituting  equation  (A6)  into  (A5')  we finally  obtain:
7  + (r  +  e-q)  (A.7)
which  is  the  fundamental  dynamic  equation  that  relates  the  current  account
deficit  with changes  in  the  net  foreign  liabilities  of the  monetary
authority. Provided  that  the  definitions  of 7  and  #  coincide  with those- 59  -
implied  by the  activities  of  the  government  sector,  we may substitute
equation  (A.7)  into  equation  (21)  to obtain  the  current  account  deficit
under  the  premise  of a constant  domestic  debt/output  ratio.
Doing  this  yields:
7 - g-  + (r  - q) p  (q  +  J  - t)p  (A.8)
y
Equation  (A.8)  states  that  the  current  account  basically  finances
the  gap  between  the  fiscal  deficit  and  the  monetary  liabilities  of the
economy  in  a situation  with a constant  domestic  debt/GDP  ratio. If  the
government's  seignorage  and  inflation  tax  are  higher  than  the  operational
fiscal  deficit,  the  country  will run  a current  account  surplus. 1
Finally,  the  sustainable  current  account  deficit,  defined  to  be
the  one that  raises  external  debt  only  at the  rate  of economic  growth,  is
obtained  from  equation  (A.7) Setting  #  - 0 and  solving  for  7 we get:
7  *  (q  - r  -e)  (A.9)
1/  The  reader  is reminded  that,  in  this  exercise,  the  current  account
refers  only  to  the  operations  of the  Monetary  Authority.- 60 -
Not  surprisingly,  equation  (A.9)  states  that  the  current  account
may  be in  deficit  only  if  the  growth  rate  of the  economy  exceeds  the
effective  foreign  interest  rate,  i.e.  the  real  rate  plus  the real  exchange
rate  depreciation.  Otherwise,  the (government)  current  account  will  have
to be either  balanced,  or in  surplus.- 61 -
ADPendix  2
SOURCES  OF DATA
A. KENYA  (Fiscal  years;  in  million  pounds)
1.  Kenya  - Recent  Economic  Developments  and  Selected  Policy  Issues,
The  World  Bank,  report  7411-KE,  September  26, 1988.
2.  Kenya  - Public  Expenditure  Review,  Main  Report  and  Annex  Volume,
The  World  Bank,  report  7508-KE,  November  21, 1988.
3.  Kenya  - Recent  Economic  Developments,  International  Monetary  Fund,
SM/88124,  January  20,  1988.
4.  Kenya  - Exchange  rate  indices,  ETR,  IMF,  unpublished.
5.  International  Financial  Statistics,  IMF,  various  issues.
B. GHANA  (Calendar  years;  in  million  cedis)
1.  Ghana  - Structural  Adlustment  for  Growth,  Country  Economic
Memorandum,  report  7515-GH,  The  World  Bank,  November  23, 1988.
2.  Ghana  - Statistical  Annex,  SM/88/242,  IMF,  October  31, 1988.
3.  Ghana  - Exchange  rate  indices,  ETR,  IMF,  unpublished.
4.  International  Financial  Statistics,  IMF,  various  issues.- 62  -
Appendix  3
DEFINITION  OF  VARIABLES
This  Appendix  explains  the  derivation  of  variables  that  have  not
been  obtained  from  primary  sources. The following  abbreviations  are  used:
CG - Central  Government,  MA - Monetary  Authority,  NFA  - Net  Foreign  Assets.
A. Kenva
MA NFA interest  receiaptst NFA  x average  foreign  interest  rate.
MA cash  deficit:  CG cash  deficit  less  MA NFA interest  receipts.
Domestic  borrowinx:  derived  as a residual.
CG stock  of domestic  debt:  constructed  on the  basis  of CG net  domestic
borrowing.
Nominal  average  domestic  calculated  implicitly  from  budget  interest
interest  rate:  payments  and  the  average  domestic  debt
outstanding.
CG stock  of foreign  debt:  constructed  on the  basis  of CG foreign  interest
payments  and  the  average  foreign  interest  rate
MA net  foreign  debt:  CG stock  of foreign  debt less  MA NFA.
Foreign  inflation:  derived  implicitly  from  the  real  exchange  rate
formula.
All  variables  have  been  deflated  by the  CPI  and  all  translations
to and  from  the local  currency  have  used  the  average  nominal  dollar
exchange  rate. All  variables  are  expressed  in  Kenyan  pounds. National
income  accounts  data,  wherever  unavailable  in fiscal  years,  have  been
transformed  to fiscal  year  basis  through  a simple  arithmetic  average.
Calculations  based  on flow  and  stock  variables  have  used  a stock  average
over the  relevant  per.od.- 63 -
B.  GHANA
Nominal  averaae  foreian  Calculated  implicitly  from  budget  foreign
interest  rate:  interest  payments  and  foreign  debt  outstanding.
MA NFA  interest  receipts:  NFA  x average  foreign  interst  rate.
MA cash  deficit:  CG  cash  deficit  less  MA NFA  interest  receipts.
Domestic  borrowingt  derived  as a residual.
Nominal  average  domestic  calculated  implicitly  from  budget  domestic
interest  rate:  interest  payments  and  the  average  domestic  debt
outstanding.
MA net foreign  debtt  CG stock  of foreign  debt  less  MA NFA
Foreign  inflation:  derived  implicitly  from  the  real  exchange  rate
formula.
All  variables  have  been  deflated  by the  CPI  and  all  translations
to#  and  from  the local  currency  have  used  the  average  nominal  dollar
exchange  rate. All  variables  are  expressed  in  Ghanaian  cedis.
Calculations  based  on flow  and  stock  variables  have  used  a stock  average
over  the  relevant  period.- 64 -
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